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RETHINKING MANNER AND FORM:
FROM PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY
0
TO CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
By R.

ELLIOT*

The issue of whether a legislative body in a democratic society can bind
itself on matters relating to the procedures by which the legislation is
to be enacted, amended or repealed has, to this point, tended to dissolve
into the question of which of two contending formulations of the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty one prefers, Dicey's traditional formulation
or the "new view" by Jennings and others. The author argues that,
regardless of how one formulates it, the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty provides an unsound basis upon which to resolve this issue,
and that an alternative basis is therefore needed. That alternative basis,
he contends, flows from the recognition that the courts are the ultimate
arbiters of what the law is in a given society, and that, in this context, the
power to determine what the law is carries with it the power to determine
to a significant degree how it is that the society will govern itself. For
this reason, the courts must ensure that in making such determinations,
they take their guidance from, and give expression to, the values of the
legal and political culture of that society. These values will include, but
will not be limited to, the values reflected in the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty.

[I]f Parliament is sovereign, there is nothing it cannot do by legislation; if there is
nothing Parliament cannot do by legislation, it may bind itself hard and fast by
legislation; if Parliament so binds itself by legislation there are things it cannot do
by legislation; and if there are such things Parliament is not sovereign.
- Professor Hamish Gray
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I. INTRODUCTION
For a number of years, I set as one of the problems for my
first year legal writing students in Constitutional Law a question
about the effectiveness of what courts and constitutional scholars
have come to call self-imposed manner and form requirements.
The scenario that the students were asked to consider involved a
provincial legislature purporting to enact a section 33 legislative
override 2 by simple majority vote in the face of a statute enacted by
a previous legislature stipulating (a) that in order for a valid
override to be enacted a full three-quarters of the MLA's voting had
to support it, and (b) that no amendments could be made to the
statute unless they were approved by the same three-quarters
majority.3 The issue for the students was whether or not the section
33 override would be held to be valid by the courts. Would the
courts hold that the manner and form requirement enacted by the
previous legislature was binding on all future legislatures (unless and
until repealed or altered in the manner stipulated), such that failure
to observe it would render the override invalid? Or would they

1 The term "manner and form requirement" appears to have its origins in section 5 of
the ColonialLaws Validity Act 1865 (U.K), 28 & 29 Vict., c. 65, [hereinafter Colonial Laws
Validity Act] which authorized colonial legislatures to amend their constitutions but inter alia
stipulated that such amendments had to be made "in such manner and fonn as may from time
to time be requiredby any Act of Parliament, letters patent, order in council or colonial law
for the time being in force in the said colony" (emphasis added). The effect of section 5 was
to condition the validity of such amendments on the observance by the colonial legislature of
requirements relating to both the manner (or procedure) by which and the form in which
such amendments were to be made, provided those requirements were embodied in one of the
four kinds of legal instruments listed (see, in this regard, A.G. N.S.W. v. Trethowan, [1932]
A.C. 526 [hereinafter Trethowan]). The addition of the modifier "self-imposed" is designed
to make it clear that the manner and form requirements with which this paper is concerned
are not those set forth in an entrenched constitution but those that a legislative body seeks
to impose on itself by way of ordinary legislation.
2 This is a reference to section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Part I of the Constitution Aci; 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter]. Section 33 authorizes the Parliament of Canada and the
provincial legislatures to immunize their legislation from challenge on the basis of a number
of the provisions in the Charter for a period of five years at a time.
3 The reason for adding this second check was to "entrench" the first. Without the
second clause the first could be repealed by simple majority vote of the legislature, leaving the
legislature free to enact its override by simple majority vote.
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hold that that requirement could be ignored, leaving the future

legislatures free to enact overrides in the same way they enact other
legislation, by simple majority vote?
The legal materials - cases and academic commentary - to
which the students were expected to have recourse were provided.
This was not, in other words, a research exercise. The cases to

which they were directed were R. v. Invin,4 A.G. N.S.W. v.
Trethowan,5 Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe,6 Reference Re

Agricultural Products MarketingAct, 7 Manuel v. A.G., 8 Reference Re
Manitoba Language Rights9 (added to the list in 1986) and R. v.
Mercurel° (added in 1988). They were also encouraged to look at
the discussions of parliamentary sovereignty in Professor Heuston's
1 and Professor Hogg's
collection of Essays in Constitutional Law
2

textbook ConstitutionalLaw of Canada.!
The conclusion reached by the overwhelming majority of
students on the basis of these authorities was that our courts would

invalidate the override. The manner and form requirement imposed
by the earlier legislature would be found to be binding on all future
legislatures that wished to enact an override clause, they said, unless
4 [1926] Ex C.R. 127 [hereinafter Irwin].

This case is discussed below in the text

accompanying notes 44 and 45.
5 Supra, note 1.

This case is discussed infra in the text accompanying note 23 and in

note 23 itself.
6 [1965] A.C. 172 [hereinafter Ranasinghe]. This case is discussed below in the text
accompanying note 43.
7 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 [hereinafterAgriculturalProductsReference]. This case is discussed
infra in the text accompanying note 45 and in note 45 itself.
8 (1982), [1983] Ch. 77 (C.A.) [hereinafter Manuel]. This case is discussed infra in the
text accompanying notes 17-20 and in notes 19 and 20.
9 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 [hereinafter Language Rights Reference]. This case is discussed
infra in note 46.
10 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234 [hereinafter Mercure]. This case is discussed below in the text
accompanying notes 13, 46 and 74.
11 R.F.V. Heuston, Essays in ConstitutionalLaw, 2d ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1964)
c. 1. Professor Heuston's views are discussed below in the text accompanying notes 25-29.
12 P.W. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) c. 12.
Professor Hogg's views are discussed below in the text accompanying notes 31-45.

218

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOi. 29 No. 2

and until that requirement were repealed or altered in accordance
with the special procedures prescribed for the repeal or amendment
of the statute in which it was imposed. Because that requirement
had not been met in this instance, and because no attempt had been
made to repeal or alter it in accordance with the prescribed
procedures, the override clause, they asserted, could not be said to
have been validly enacted. Most of the students who reached this
conclusion placed great emphasis on the decisions in Trethowan,
Ranasinghe and, more recently, the Language Rights Reference and
Mercure. The views of Professor Heuston and Professor Hogg also
received a good deal of play.
I suspect that most Canadian lawyers would reach the same
conclusion as these students. On balance, the authorities do seem
to support the view that, while attempts by a legislative body to bind
its successors on matters of substantive policy will not be effective,
a manner and form requirement enacted by a legislative body will be
binding on its successors. This is particularly true of the Heuston
and Hogg texts. It is also true of the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Mercure, in which the failure of the
Saskatchewan legislature to respect the obligation imposed by
section 110 of the North-West TenitoriesAct7 3 to print legislation in
both English and French was held to render such legislation invalid.
Unlike section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, which imposes a
similar obligation on the Manitoba legislature but which is part of
the Constitution of Canada and hence subject to special amending
rules, section 110 amounted - as the Court recognized - to ordinary

legislation. Hence it was subject to repeal or amendment by the
Saskatchewan legislature acting on its own in the ordinary way (for
example, by simple majority vote) provided, of course, that the
repealing or amending legislation was enacted in both languages.
On one level, defined by the authorities, the answer that the
majority of the students have given to the problem cannot be said
to have been surprising. But on another level, it was surprising.
When I gave the students the problem, I admonished them not to
assume that the solution lay within the four corners of the
authorities. I urged them to think critically about those authorities
13 R.S.C. 1886, c. 50 as am. R.S.C. 1985, c. N-27.
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and their relevance to the specific problem that they had been
assigned. In particular, I asked them to view the problem as raising
a question about the values upon which our constitution is based
and to attempt to isolate, and discuss the relative importance of, the
values that this particular problem called into play. In spite of these
urgings, very few of the students did look behind or beyond the
authorities and those that did tended to focus on the fact that the
purpose of this manner and form requirement was to promote the
values embodied in the rights and freedoms expressed in the
Charter. This, they contended, would be certain to enure to the
benefit of that requirement in the competition between it and the
override clause. Almost totally ignored - and herein lay the surprise
- is the fact that the manner and form requirement posed a very
real and serious threat to one of the cardinal principles of
democratic self-government - majority rule. The one or two
students every year who did recognize this dimension of the problem
acknowledged that it would operate against the requirement. They
were usually amongst the small group of students that concluded
that the override clause would be upheld as valid.
Why is it that so few students incorporated a discussion of
the challenge to democratic self-government posed by this manner
and form requirement into their analysis? I suspect that, in the case
of some students, the failure to do so flowed from an impoverished
understanding of democracy: they simply did not see the difficulty.
But I also suspect that, in the case of a good many of the students,
the failure to do so was attributable less to them and their lack of
understanding of democracy than to the way in which the question
of the effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements
has traditionally been approached, particularly by constitutional
scholars. This traditional approach conceives of the question in
terms of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and attempts to
resolve it through a highly formalistic and abstracted process of
definition; it makes it exceedingly difficult to incorporate into one's
legal analysis concerns about democracy and other important
constitutional values that a particular manner and form requirement
might engage. To ensure that such concerns would find easy and
full expression, a new approach would have to be constructed and
most first year students are, it seems clear, reluctant to embark on
such a task, even in the face of encouragement from their professor.
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It is not my intention here to write the opinion
memorandum that I would have liked my students to have written.
Nor do I propose to provide a blueprint for the way in which I
would resolve this particular manner and form problem were I a
judge. My objective is simply to make the case for rethinking the
way we approach the question of the effectiveness of self-imposed
manner and form requirements. In attempting to make that case, I
will, from time to time, make reference to this particular problem.
But I will also refer to other hypotheticals where I think it will be
helpful to do so. My primary interest is with the way in which we
approach this question in Canada. However, the alternative to the
traditional approach that I suggest we adopt is one that would have
application in any country that has a democratic and reasonably
stable political system.
II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH DESCRIBED
The effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form
requirements has been the subject of debate amongst constitutional
scholars for some time! 4 I do not propose to review that debate in
any detail, but it is necessary, if I am going to be able to critique
what I have termed the traditional approach in this area, that I
review it at least in terms of its broad outlines. Reflecting the fact
that the debate has focused on the ability of the Parliament of the
United Kingdom to impose binding manner and form requirements
on itself, I will frequently refer to that institution in this review.
The starting point of any such review is Professor Dicey's
formulation of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Having
defined Parliament as the Queen, the House of Lords and the

14 A number of the scholars who have written in this area are mentioned in the text that
follows. Others not mentioned include H.W.R. Wade, 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty,"
[1955] Cambridge LJ. 172; G. Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Coninonwealth
(Oxford: Clarendon Pre~s, 1957) passim; S.A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative
Law, 4th ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981) c. 4; W.S. Tamopolsky, The Canadian Bill of
Rights, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1975) c. 3; W.E. Conklin, "Pickin and its Applicability to
Canada" (1975) 25 U.T.LJ. 193; and K. Swinton, "Challenging the Validity of an Act of
Parliament: The Effect of Enrolment and Parliamentary Privilege" (1976) 14 Osgoode Hall
LJ. 345.
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House of Commons "acting together," he said that "Parliament thus
defined has, under the English constitution, the right to make or
unmake any law whatever, and further, no person or body is
recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or
set aside the legislation of Parliament. ''15 According to Dicey, the
only limits on the power of the British Parliament to legislate were
extra-legal: the "internal" limits that flowed from the fact that
elected representatives were likely to be imbued with, and hence
constrained by, the moral and political values of the majority of the
electorate and the "external" limits imposed by the knowledge that
the electorate would be unlikely to obey legislation that was wholly
at odds with those values. Although it seems clear that Dicey was
primarily concerned with the absence of any judicially enforceable
substantive limitations on the power of the British Parliament, rather
than the absence of any judicially enforceable procedural limitations
on its power, this formulation of the doctrine has generally been
taken to cover both. Hence, if it is accepted, attempts by one
Parliament to bind future Parliaments as to the procedures by which,
or the manner and form in which, future legislation is to be enacted
are considered to be no more effective legally than attempts to bind
future Parliaments on matters of substance or policy.
Dicey's formulation of the doctrine has come under challenge
from a number of constitutional scholars, particularly in the latter
half of this century. But it has to this day always been the
16
preferred formulation of the courts in the United Kingdom.
Although challenges to the validity of legislation enacted by the
Parliament of the United Kingdom have been few and far between,
the courts there have consistently rejected those that have been
brought. A good example is the decision in Manuel, which arose
out of the patriation of Canada's constitution in the early 1980s.
The challenge in that case was to the validity of the Canada Act

15 A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London:

MacMillan, 1965) at

3940.
16 See, for example, Vauxhall Estates Ltd v. Liverpool Corporation, [1932] 1 KB.733;
Ellen Street Estates Ltd v. Minister of Health, [1934] 1 LB. 590; British Coal Corporation v.
R, [1935] A.C. 500; and British Railways Board v. Pickin, [1974] 2 W.L.R. 208 (H.L.).
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198217 and was based on the contention that section 4 of the Statute
of Westminster18 imposed on the Parliament of the United Kingdom
a binding requirement that, before it enacted legislation intended to
apply in Canada, it had to have the consent of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada, whose consent in this instance, of course, had
been lacking. Z9 That contention was summarily rejected by Megarry,
V.C., who said that
the duty of the court is to obey and apply every Act of Parliament, and ... the court
cannot hold any such Act to be ultra vires. ... [lit is a fundamental of the English
constitution that Parliament is supreme. As a matter of law the courts of England
recognise Parliament
as being omnipotent in all save the power to destroy its own
20
omnipotence.

One of the first constitutional scholars to challenge Dicey's
formulation of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was Sir Ivor
Jennings.21 At the heart of his critique was the contention that
Dicey's formulation left unanswered the question of what constituted
a valid expression of the will of Parliament. Not only was that a
question that had to be answered if one was going to construct a
comprehensive doctrine, he argued, but it was clear to him that,
17 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
18 (U.K.), 22 Geo. 5, c. 4. Section 4 provides as follows:
No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of
this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law
of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion has
requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof.
19 By its terms, section 4 imposes a form requirement on the Parliament of the United
Kingdom. The plaintiffs argued that section 4 should also be read as imposing a manner
requirement to the effect that no law made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom could
have effect in a Dominion unless that Dominion had in fact requested and consented to its
enactment. They also argued that at least insofar as Canada was concerned, "Dominion"
should be read to include inter alia the Indian nations of Canada.
20 Manuel, supra, note 8 at 89. It should be noted that an appeal from the decision of
Megarry V.C. to the Court of Appeal, ibid. at 99, was dismissed on the ground that, even if
section 4 could be said to impose a binding form requirement (refusing to accept that it
imposed a binding manner requirement as well), that requirement had been satisfied in the
enactment of the Canada Act 1982. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was denied,
ibid. at 110.
21 W.I. Jennings, The Law and The Constitution, 4th ed. (London: University of London
Press, 1952) c. 4.
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when one did answer it, one was driven to conclude that the
doctrine as Dicey had formulated it was unacceptable. The reason

that was so was that, for Jennings, that question was a question of
law and, as such, was one over which Parliament itself had control.

He expressed the revised doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to
which this reasoning led him in the following terms:
"Legal sovereignty' is merely a name indicating that the legislature has for the time
being power to make laws of any kind in the manner required by the law. That is,
a rule expressed to be made by the King, "with the advice and consent of the Lords
spiritual and temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and
by the authority of the same", will be recognised by the courts, including a rule
which alters this law itself. If this is so, the "legal sovereign" may impose legal
limitations upon itself, because its power to change the law includes the power to
change the law affecting itself ... The law is that Parliament may make any law in
the manner and form provided by the law. That manner and form is provided, at
present, either by the common law or by the Parliament Act of 1911. But
Parliament may, if it pleases, provide another manner and form. Suppose, for
instance, that the present Parliament enacted that the House of Lords should not
be abolished except after a majority of electors had expressly agreed to it, and that
no Act repealing that Act should be passed except after a similar referendum.
There is no law to appeal to except that Act. The Act provides a new manner and
its passing
form which must be followed unless
2 2 it can be said that at the time of
that Act was void or of no effect.

In support of this alternative formulation of the doctrine of
parliamentary supremacy, Jennings relied on the decision of the
Privy Council in Trethowan, in which the legislature of New South
Wales was held to be bound by a self-imposed manner and form
requirement.2 3 The fact that that decision appeared to have been

based on a provision of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865,24 a
statute to which the Parliament of the United Kingdom was not
subject, was, in his view, of no moment. But it is clear from
Jennings's discussion of this issue that his preference for this revised
formulation of the doctrine lay not in the fact that there was a
22 Ibid. at 147-49.
23 The requirement in that case stipulated that no bill to abolish the upper house of the
state legislature could be presented for Royal Assent without first being approved in a public
referendum. To protect that requirement from repeal by simple majority vote, the legislation
also stipulated that a bill repealing it had to be approved in a referendum. The case arose
when a future legislature purported both to repeal the legislation embodying these
requirements and to abolish the upper house without holding referenda.
24 The provision in question is section 5, referred to supra, note 1.
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decision of the Privy Council that appeared to support it but in the
simple and highly appealing logic upon which it was based. Even if,
as many .have argued, Trethowan does not provide support for
Jennings's view of the appropriate way to define parliamentary
sovereignty under the Constitution of the United Kingdom, he
would have argued for it.
Professor Heuston, writing in the early 1960s, summarized
Jennings's "new view" of parliamentary sovereignty, to which he
subscribed, in the following terms:
(1) Sovereignty is a legal concept: the rules which identify the sovereign and
prescribe its composition and functions are logically prior to it.

(2) There is a distinction between rules which govern, on the one hand, (a) the
composition, and (b) the procedure and, on the other hand, (c) the areas of
power, of a sovereign legislature.

(3) The courts have jurisdiction to question the validity of an alleged Act of
Parliament on grounds 2(a) and 2(b), but not on ground 2(c).

(4) This jurisdiction is exercisable either before or after the Royal Assent has been
signified - in the former
case by way of injunction, in the latter by way of
25
declaratory judgment.

Heuston, like Jennings, saw Trethowan as providing strong support
for the new view. The fact that Sir Owen Dixon, one of the judges
of the High Court of Australia who sat on that case, had
subsequently written that the decision represented "a modern
reconciliation of the supremacy of the law and the supremacy of
Parliament,"26 and clearly saw it as endorsing the new view, was
taken to be an important indication that the case should not be
viewed as having turned on the fact that New South Wales was
governed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865. Heuston also
relied on decisions of the Irish Court of Appeal and the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa in cases arising
under the constitutions of the Irish Free State and South Africa
respectively.2 7 Both decisions resulted in legislation being declared
invalid on the ground that its passage had been achieved otherwise
than in accordance with manner and form requirements prescribed
25 Essays in ConstitutionalLaw, supra, note 11 at 6-7.
26 0. Dixon, 'The Law and the Constitution" (1935) 51 L.Q. Rev. 590 at 604.
27 R?.v. Military Govcrnor, N.D.U. Internment Camp, [1924] 1 I.R. 32 (C.A.); and Harris
v. Minister of the Interior, [1952] 2 S.A. 429 (App. Div.).
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by the constitution in question. However, as with Jennings, it is
clear that it was not these authorities but rather the inherent logical
appeal of the new view that impelled Heuston to adopt it in
preference to that of Dicey. He saw in the new view the "strict
logic and high technique"28 of the common law so admired by the
English lawyer, and said, "The great advantage of the new doctrine
is that it enables these tremendous issues to be decided according to
the ordinary law in the ordinary courts. By redefining the doctrine
of sovereignty from within its own
four corners, the common law has
29
shown its instinctive wisdom."
The new view of parliamentary sovereignty has clearly
become the preferred view amongst constitutional scholars, 30 and it
is this view that Hogg adopts in his text when he comes to deal with
the effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements.
He draws a sharp distinction between substance and procedure, and
acknowledges that "a legislative body is not bound by self-imposed
' 31
restraints as to the content, substance or policy of its enactments.
The rationale for this, he says,
is clear. If a legislative body could bind itself not to do something in the future,
then a government could use its parliamentary majority to protect its policies from
alteration or repeal. This would lay a dead hand on
a government subsequently
32
elected to power in a new election with new issues.

But "it is reasonably clear," he goes on to say, "that a legislative
body may be bound by self-imposed procedural (or manner and

28 Essays in ConstitutionalLaw, supra, note 11 at 31.
29/Ibid

30 One scholar who refused to join with those who rejected Dicey's formulation in favour
of the new view of parliamentary sovereignty is H.W.R. Wade. His preference for Dicey's

formulation was based in part on his view of the authorities, but more importantly on the
assertion that "the rule enjoining judicial obedience to statutes is one of the fundamental rules
upon which the legal system depends" and, as such, cannot be altered by Parliament: "The

rule is above and beyond the reach of statute ... because it is itself the source of the authority
of statute." Supra, note 14 at 187. He characterized the rule as a "political fact," changeable

only "by revolution." Ibid at 189.
31 ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, supra, note 12 at 262.
32/ibid.
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33

He begins this part of his
analysis by asserting that "[t]here is of course no doubt as to the
binding character of the rules in the Constitution that define the
composition of the legislative bodies and the steps required in the
legislative process."34 He then claims, in accordance with the new
view of parliamentary sovereignty, that subject to provisions of the
Constitution of Canada, such as those protecting the role of the
Crown and the Senate from alteration by ordinary legislation, it is
open to Parliament or a provincial legislature to "'re-define itself' by
form) restraints on its enactments.

changing the nature of the legislative process ...either for all

statutes or just for particular statutes."35 He gives as examples of
such redefinitions, Parliament requiring the approval of the
electorate in a referendum before the office of the Auditor-General
could be abolished, and a provincial legislature barring changes to
electoral constituencies unless the changes have the support of
two-thirds of the members of the legislative assembly. Legislation
enacted in disregard of these manner and form requirements
would,
36
courts."
the
by
invalid
be
to
held
he asserts, "be
Unlike Jennings and Heuston, who appear to believe that all
manner and form requirements must be taken to be binding, Hogg
acknowledges that some might, in fact, be attempts to impose
limitations on the substance of future legislation, and accepts that it
would be appropriate for the courts to treat them as such - that is,
37
to hold that they are not binding on future legislatures.
Friedmann appears to have been the first of the new view scholars
to recognize that the line between substance and procedure was not
a bright one, and that courts that adopted this view would have to

33 Ibid

34 Ibid
35 Ibid. at 262-63.
36 Ibid at 263.
37 Hogg also makes exceptions for what he calls purely "directory" procedural requirements (by which he means requirements that are held by the courts not to have legal force,
even though they are embodied in legal instruments), rules of interpretation, and purely
"internal" rules of parliamentary procedure. Ibid at 264.
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come up with some way of distinguishing one from the other. 38 He
proposed an extension of the pith and substance test used by
Australian (and Canadian) courts in division of powers cases into
this area. If, in pith and substance, a manner and form requirement
was directed to procedure, it would be held to be binding; if to
substance, it would be held not to be binding. Friedmann acknowledged that under such a test, "the borderline would be a matter for
judicial discretion in appraisal of a particular situation."39 He
consoled himself with the thought that "[tihat ... is nothing novel.
No conceivable formula could lay down satisfactorily
when the
40
exercise of a legislative power becomes an abuse."
Hogg cites no Canadian cases in support of the view that
self-imposed manner and form requirements would be held to be
binding by Canadian courts'
The cases he does cite, which include
Trethowan and Ranasinghe, he acknowledges, do not provide
unequivocal support for it: Trethowan because "it could be explained
as resting on section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act"4 2 and the
others, including Ranasinghe, because they "involved restrictions in
the constitution [of the country in question] itself, although," he goes
on to add, "the constitution was as freely amendable as an ordinary

38 W. Friedmann, 'Trethowan's Case, Parliamentary Sovereignty, and the Limits of Legal
Change" (1950-51) 24 Austl. LJ. 103 at 105. Friedmann credits MeTiernan J., one of the
judges who sat alongside Dixon CJ. on the High Court of Australia when that Court decided
Trethowan, with this insight.

39 Ibid. at 106. For an example of how that discretion might be exercised, see the obiter
dicta of King CJ. in West Lakes Ltd v. South Australia (1980) 25 S.A.S.R. 389 at 396-98.

40 Ibid
41 He does, however, cite one case, Gallant v. R, [1949] 2 D.L.R. 425 (P.E.I.S.C.), in

support of his assertion that manner and form requirements set forth in the Constitution of
Canada are binding. The decision in that case was to the effect that it was not open to a
provincial lieutenant-governor to give royal assent to a bill from which royal assent had
previously been withheld under sections 55 and 56 of the Constitution Ac4 1867 (U.K.), 30 &
31 Vict., c. 3 [formerly British North America Ac, 1867]. This case might be said to support
Hogg's claim that self-imposed manner and form requirements are also binding, but as I think

even he would concede, it does so only in the most limited sense. It simply removes what
might otherwise be an obstacle to that claim: if courts were not prepared to enforce manner
and form requirements embodied in the Constitution, the "supreme law," a fortiori they would
not be prepared to enforce self-imposed manner and form requirements.
42 ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, supra, note 12 at 263.
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statute."43 His commitment to this view appears to depend largely
on the fact that the new view of parliamentary sovereignty has
found favour with the great majority of constitutional scholars who
have expressed an opinion on the effectiveness of such
requirements.
The only Canadian cases decided prior to 1985, when Hogg
wrote, that might be said to have been directly relevant to this issue
and of which I am aware, suggest that he probably should have been
somewhat more tentative in expressing his view than he was. In
both of these cases, Irwin and Agricultural Products Reference, the
courts were asked to declare federal legislation unconstitutional on
the ground that it was enacted in violation of the procedures for the
handling of money bills in sections 53 and 54 of what is now the
Constitution Act, 1867.44 In neither case was the court prepared to
accept the premise on which the challenge to the legislation was
based, which was that the legislation in question was in fact a money
bill. But both courts went on to say that, even if they had accepted
that premise, the challenge would have failed. In so doing, they
adopted, in the first case explicitly and in the second implicitly,
Dicey's view of parliamentary sovereignty. In Irwin, the judge said,
as Megarry V.C. was later to do in Manuel, that it was the court's
duty to accept as having been validly enacted any and all legislation
that appeared to have received the approval of the
Governor-General, the Senate and the House of Commons. In the

43 Aid This latter assertion is a bit surprising given the fact that the issue in these cases
was precisely whether or not the constitutions were as freely amendable as an ordinary statute
- and they were held not to be. In both of these cases (the other being Harrisv. Minister of
the Interior, supra, note 27) the court in question refused to recognize as valid legislation that

had not been enacted in the manner prescribed by the relevant constitution, thereby
entrenching those prescriptions.
44 Supra, note 41. Sections 53 and 54 provide as follows:
53. Bills for appropriating any Part of the Public Revenue or for imposing any Tax
or Impost, shall originate in the House of Commons.
54. It shall not be lawful for the House of Commons to adopt or pass any Vote,
Resolution, Address, or Bill for the Appropriation of any Part of the Public
Revenue, or of any Tax or Impost, to any Purpose that has not been first
recommended to that House by Message of the Governor General in the
Session in which such Vote, Resolution, Address, or Bill is proposed.
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Agricultural Products Reference, Pigeon J., speaking for himself and
four other members of the Supreme Court of Canada, said that
sections 53 and 54 are not entrenched provisions of the constitution, they are
clearly within those parts which the Parliament of Canada is empowered to amend
by section 91(1). Absent a special requirement such as in section 2 of the
Canadian Bill of Rights, nothing prevents Parliament from indirectly amending
in such
sections 53 and 54 by providing for the levy and
4 5 appropriation of taxes
manner as it sees fit, by delegation or otherwise.

It is by no means clear what it was about section 2 of the Canadian
Bill of Rights that, in Pigeon J.'s mind, served to distinguish it from
sections 53 and 54, but there can be no doubt that he did not
consider the latter to be binding on the Parliament of Canada.
Parliament was free to ignore the procedural requirements they
imposed. To the extent that it did so, sections 53 and 54 were to
be considered as having been impliedly amended.
When the next edition of Hogg's text is written, he will be
able to support his view about the binding nature of self-imposed
manner and form requirements by reference to the recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mercure.4 6 Reference will
probably be made to the fact that, in the course of his reasons for
judgment, La Forest J. cited, with apparent approval, the view of
both Jennings and Hogg himself on the binding nature of such
requirements. Therefore, Mercure can, with some justification, be
said to reflect a choice on the part of the current Supreme Court of

45

AgriculturalProductsReference, supra, note 7 at 1291. Laskin J., who wrote for himself
and the three other members of the Court, refused to commit himself on the question of
"whether sections 53 and 54 lay down prescriptions which are cognizable in the Courts."
Ibid. at 1229. His only comment on this aspect of the case was that the fact that British
courts did not consider it appropriate to review legislation for conformity to procedural
requirements should not be viewed as decisive when Canadian courts came to consider tile
question of whether or not it was appropriate for them to enforce procedural requirements
embodied in the Constitution Ac4 1867.
46 Hogg will also no doubt cite the decision in Language Rights Reference, supra, note 9,
in support of his preliminary and, at least for him, non-controversial assertion that manner and
form requirements imposed by the Constitution of Canada are binding. In that case the
Supreme Court of Canada, relying in part on the decision in Ranasinghe, held that legislation
not enacted by the Manitoba Legislature in both French and English in accordance with
section 23 of the Manitoba Ac4 1870 was invalid. The relevance of such a holding to Hogg's
claim about the effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements is discussed supra
in note 41.

230

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 29 No. 2

Canada to prefer the new view of parliamentary sovereignty to that
of Dicey.
III. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH CRITIQUED
To this point, then, the debate about the effectiveness of
self-imposed manner and form requirements has tended to dissolve
into a question of to which of two opposing views of parliamentary
sovereignty one subscribes. If one subscribes to Dicey's view, one
is bound to conclude that such requirements are not binding. If one
subscribes to the new view championed by Jennings, Heuston, Hogg
and others, one is bound to conclude that, subject to specific and
express limitations prescribed by the provisions of an entrenched
constitutional document, and (possibly) to the power of the courts
to control abuse, they are binding.
If this were the only basis upon which the debate had to be
resolved, I would be hard pressed to choose between the two views
of parliamentary sovereignty that it has generated. That would be
true even if I were concerned only with countries without an
entrenched constitution; countries in which, in other words, it is
meaningful to describe the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as
a, if not the, governing principle of the constitution. The major
problem with Dicey's formulation of the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty is that it introduces a significant element of inflexibility
into the constitutions of such countries. 47 For example, it precludes
the possibility of the Parliament of the United Kingdom enacting a
Bill of Rights that would prevail over inconsistent legislation enacted
by future Parliaments, even if every Mp and every member of the
electorate supported the enactment of such a bill. It also precludes
the possibility of entrenching new procedures for the enactment of
particular kinds of legislation to ensure that the interests of
particular minority groups find adequate expression in the legislative

47 There is something of an irony in this given the fact that, in Dicey's view, one of the

major attributes of the British constitution was its flexibility: "Every part of it," he said, "can
be expanded, curtailed, amended, or abolished, with equal ease." The Law of the Consitution,
supra, note 15 at 91. At least in the one respect noted here, he was clearly wrong in asserting

this.
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process, again even if these new procedures had the unanimous
support of all MPs and the electorate. In short, it assumes that
leaving it up to a simple majority of the members of the House of
Commons and the House of Lords to decide what is right for the
people of the United Kingdom will always be the preferred way of
deciding that question. 48 In a very real sense, in other words, it
takes out of the hands of those people and their elected
representatives the power to determine the most important question

of all - how it is that they wish to govern themselves.
Dicey's formulation is also vulnerable to criticism on the
ground that it creates the impression that the courts are merely
passive actors in the process of determining what the law is. They
simply accept as the law whatever the Parliament of the day says it
is. But this impression of passivity is a false one. Ultimate
responsibility for determining what the law is rests with the courts,
and it is no less an active choice on their part to accept whatever
the Parliament of the day acting in traditional fashion says it is than

it is to hold the Parliament of the day bound by manner and form
requirements imposed by the Parliaments of yester-year. It is a
choice of one view of how the United Kingdom should be governed

48 Dicey himself had no difficulty with the idea that the Parliament of the United
Kingdom might see fit at some point to abolish the House of Lords; he said that the
enactment of legislation to that end was no less within Parliament's competence than the
enactment of legislation "to give London a municipality" (Ibid at 88). H.W.R. Wade, a
supporter of Dicey, had no difficulty accepting the validity of the ParliamentAct of 1911 and
1949 which cut back on the power of the House of Lords (Wade, supra, note 14 at 193).
ParliamentAct, 1911 (U.K.), 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13; ParliamentAct, 1949 (U.K.), 12, 13 & 14
Geo. 6, c. 103. It would appear, therefore, that at least in the minds of those who subscribe
to it, Dicey's formulation allows for flexibility in the law-making process to the extent that that
process is made more easy; only attempts to make the process more difficult are ruled out.
If they are correct in this, then alongside the problem of inflexibility that I have identified, one
has to add the problem of lack of consistency. What possible justification is there for giving
effect to legislation that "redefines" Parliament in such a way as to facilitate the enactment of
legislation while denying effect to legislation that "redefines" it in such a way as to hamper the
enactment of legislation? H.W.R. Wade appears to recognize this problem when he comments
on the significance of the ParliamentActs of 1911 and 1949: he characterizes them as
"creating yet a further species of delegated legislation." Of the Act of 1911 he says, "the
threefold sovereign has delegated its power, subject to restrictions, to a new and non-sovereign
body made up of two of its parts only" (Wade, supra, note 14 at 193-94). But such a
characterization of these Acts seems hardly plausible. (See, in this regard, the comments of
Professor Marshall in Parliamenta., Sovereign., and the Commonwealth, supra, note 14 at

43-46).
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over another. And it is a choice, as we have just seen, with
potentially profound consequences.
But it is clear that the new view of parliamentary sovereignty
poses serious problems as well. The greatest weakness in this
approach is the threat to democratic values that it embodies. In the
hands of Jennings and Heuston, this new view of parliamentary
sovereignty would require the courts to enforce a self-imposed
requirement that no future Parliament could amend or repeal any
existing legislation unless, for example, the amending or repealing
legislation received the unanimous support of the members of both
the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The "strict logic"
of the new view would necessitate characterizing such a requirement
as a "redefinition" of Parliament and of the way in which the will of
Parliament is to be expressed. Any approach to questions about the
effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements that
would permit such a result is clearly badly flawed. Moreover, with
all due respect to those who subscribe to the new view, it is surely
naive to think that the courts would think otherwise. No court in
a society with a strong democratic tradition is going to turn a blind
eye to the profound implications for democratic self-government of
a manner and form requirement of such a character.
This weakness in the new view can, I think, be attributed to
the fact that those who devised it forgot the reason why it is
generally thought to be wrong to allow one Parliament to bind
future Parliaments on matters of substance or policy. That reason,
which is explicitly acknowledged by Hogg, is that it would be
anti-democratic to permit the representatives of previous electorates
to determine the policies upon which the representatives of today's
electorate must govern. 49 The electorate of today is clearly not able
to exercise the right of self-government it would otherwise have if
its hands have been tied in terms of the policies it can pursue by
legislation attributable to previous electorates. But if that is the
case, then why should we not be concerned about manner and form
requirements that make the passage of certain kinds of legislation
more difficult? The inroads on the right of self-government made
by such requirements may not always be as significant as the inroads
49See text accompanying note 32, supra.
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that would be made if self-imposed constraints on substantive policy
were held to be binding, but they are nevertheless real. And it is
therefore wrong to ignore them when the focus shifts from the one
to the other.
Like the approach generated by Dicey's formulation of
parliamentary sovereignty, though perhaps to a lesser extent, the
approach generated by the new view is vulnerable to the criticism
that it portrays the courts as playing an essentially passive role. All
that the courts are required to do is categorize an attempt to bind
future Parliaments as either substantive or procedural - a
categorization that in the Jennings-Heuston version of the new view
turns simply on the form of the legislation in which the attempt is
made - and the result follows as a matter of course. Again,
however, the impression of passivity is a false one. By adopting
such an approach, the courts would be making a choice about the
way in which the United Kingdom should be governed, a choice that
gives considerable power to the Parliaments of yester-year to define
the kind of society that the people of today can create for
themselves.
With the addition to the new view of the pith and substance
test proposed by Friedmann and apparently endorsed by Hogg, these
criticisms would lose some of their sting. But the addition of that
test would not eliminate these problems with the new view. The
fact that the courts would be free under this approach to enforce
some self-imposed manner and form requirements but not others
means that the illusion of passivity created by the use of a hard and
fast rule would be difficult to maintain. However, as anyone who is
familiar with the application of the pith and substance test in
division of powers cases in Canada well knows, that test provides
ample opportunity for obfuscation and manipulation on the part of
judges. There is no guarantee, in other words, that judges applying
this test will provide anything approaching full and honest explanations for the choices they make, or even acknowledge that they are
making choices. The test might also provide a mechanism for
protecting democratic values from assault. But again, there is no
guarantee that concern about such values would figure in the
application of the test, and even if it did, that these values would
receive adequate protection. It is important to remember that Hogg
appears to have no difficulty whatsoever accepting that a require-
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ment of a two-thirds majority to alter the boundaries of provincial
electoral districts would be held to be binding.
Moreover, the pith and substance test introduces two new
problems into the equation. The distinction between substance and
procedure is relatively easy to make in purely formal terms in this
context, that is, in terms simply of the form of the legislation that
attempts to bind future Parliaments. But that distinction becomes
very difficult to make in pith and substance terms. Is it not the
case that any attempt to make legislation more difficult to enact has
a significant substantive element to it?
The more onerous
procedural requirements are simply the means used to achieve the
end of substantive control. Substance and procedure merge and
become, in effect, one and the same. The use of the pith and
substance test in this context seems, in short, misguided.
On top of that, it is difficult to see how, if the simple logic
of the new view is accepted, as it is by both Friedmann and Hogg,
the addition of an evaluative test like the pith and substance test
can be justified. The new view is based on the assumption that
Parliament is supreme with respect to the law relating to itself. But,
if Parliament is supreme in that sense, it necessarily follows that no
court has the power to ignore or otherwise refuse to abide by such
law relating to itself as Parliament chooses to enact. And yet it is
precisely that power that the pith and substance test gives to the
courts. How can one graft onto the new view a limitation that
challenges the very assumption upon which it is based? From a
conceptual standpoint, that would seem to be impossible.
The simple fact is that the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty is ill-equipped to deal with questions about the
effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements. That
doctrine evolved out of the victory of Parliament over the monarchy
in the competition between the two for control over what we would
now call the legislative branch of government in the United
Kingdom. As a legal doctrine, it is capable of resolving questions
that flow from any current manifestations of that same competition
that might arise. It is also capable of resolving questions about the
relationship between the courts and the Parliament of the day:
when these two institutions are in conflict about what the law in a
particular area should be, it is Parliament's view that must ultimately
prevail. But the doctrine is not capable of resolving - or at least
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resolving adequately - questions that flow from the competition that
from time to time arises between two different Parliaments, or, if
you prefer, between the Parliaments of two different eras. To
resolve such questions adequately, one needs a basis upon which to
choose between the two Parliaments. A doctrine that asserts simply
that Parliament is supreme over other institutions of government
such as the Crown and the courts clearly does not provide such a
basis. That basis has to be found elsewhere.
To this point, my critique of Dicey's and the new view
formulations of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has been
directed to their use in countries without entrenched constitutions.
It is apparent, however, that the problems with these two opposing
views of parliamentary sovereignty are no less serious when one
shifts one's attention to countries with entrenched constitutions.
Insofar as Dicey's view is concerned, the problem of inflexibility may
not be quite as significant because, if changes in the way the country
in question is governed are thought to be necessary, these changes
can presumably be introduced through a constitutional amendment.
How easily such changes can be introduced will depend on how
demanding the rules are for amending the constitution; the more
demanding they are the more significant the problem of inflexibility
will be. But the other problems with these two views remain every
bit as real under an entrenched constitution. Moreover, there is the
additional, and in my view, fundamental problem that, regardless of
whose definition one uses, the doctrine of parliamentaysovereignty
simply does not apply in countnies with entrenched constitutions.
Dicey himself recognized that there is a world of difference
between the constitutions of countries like the United Kingdom,
which are not entrenched, and those of countries like the United
States, which are. In fact, he devoted an entire chapter of his
textbook to the nature and significance of the differences between
the constitutions of these two countries. 50 And the critical
difference was that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty was not
a feature of the American constitution. In the course of that
chapter, in a passage that has too often been ignored by Canadian
courts, Dicey made it clear that, in spite of its preamble, Canada's
50

Supra, note 15, c. 3.
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constitution was "in its essential features modelled on that of the
[United States],"51 by which he meant that it was equally incorrect
to speak of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as a governing
principle of Canada's constitution. It is the entrenched constitution
that is supreme in such countries, not the legislative branch of
government, and it is to the entrenched constitution that one should
be turning for answers to questions about the effectiveness (if not
the validity) of self-imposed manner and form requirements, not the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
To say that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has no
application in countries with entrenched constitutions is not, I hasten
to add, to say that the values embodied in that doctrine are
irrelevant to the resolution of constitutional questions in such
countries. On the contrary, it is clear that many of those values the accountability of the government to the electorate, majority rule,
formal equality, free elections and others - are not only relevant to,
but of critical importance in, the resolution of such questions. But
that is because these values are reflected in the constitutions of
these countries. And, as such, when these values do come into play,
they do so alongside and in competition with other values that are
reflected in these constitutions.
In sum, then, for the reasons I have given, I am of the view
that neither in countries with entrenched constitutions nor in
countries without does it make sense to approach questions about
the effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements on
the basis of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, in either of
its forms. An alternative approach is required.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The fact is, of course, that one is not obliged to accept that
the debate about the effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form
requirements has to be resolved on the basis of which of two
different views of parliamentary sovereignty one subscribes to.
There is another way to think about the question, one that not only

51 Ibid. at 166.
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avoids the necessity of choosing between two different views of
parliamentary sovereignty, but that avoids the necessity of explicitly
engaging that principle altogether. And, at least as a way of
thinking about the question, if not necessarily in the manner in
which it plays itself out, it is an approach that can be used in
countries without, as well as in countries with, entrenched
constitutions.
I begin this alternative approach with what I take to be a
statement of the obvious, that, to borrow from Marshall C.J. in
Marbury v. Madison, it is "the province and the duty of the [courts]
to say what the law is."52 In the great majority of cases, the
determination of what the law is involves nothing more than the
interpretation of legislation or, in common law jurisdictions, the
articulation of a common law rule.53 But it is clear that, in some
cases, it involves a good deal more. In countries with entrenched
constitutions, that determination will sometimes call for the
measuring of legislation against the requirements of the constitution
to see if the legislation is valid. And both in countries with and
without such constitutions, that determination will on occasion
require the courts to choose between two apparently contradictory
legislative enactments. What the law is in such cases will depend on
which of the two enactments the courts prefer. This is no less true
of cases in which the contradiction arises out of the failure of one
legislature to satisfy a manner and form requirement imposed by one
of its predecessors than it is of cases in which the same legislative
54
body has created two primary rules which contradict each other.
52 (1803) 1 Cranch 137 at 177 (U.S.S.C.).
53 In saying "nothing more than," I do not mean to suggest that these tasks are simple
ones or that they do not allow for a great deal of judicial creativity. My comment is directed
to the kind of tasks the courts are called upon to perform, not the difficulty of their

performance.
54 That this is true in cases involving contradictory primary rules (by which I mean here
all rules that do not fit the description of a self-imposed manner and form requirement)

seems clear enough. The reason it is also true in cases involving a failure to satisfy a manner
and form requirement is that the primary rules will be different if the manner and form
requirement is held to be binding than they would be if it is held not to be. Consider the
problem that I set my students. If the manner and form requirement there were held to be
binding, the attempted override would be held to be invalid and the main body of the
legislation would be vulnerable to challenge on the basis of the Charter. If it were not held
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The reason for starting this alternative approach with this
statement of the obvious is that, unlike the approaches that have
been generated by the debate to this point, it focuses attention on
the right institution - the courts. If cases involving the effectiveness
of self-imposed manner and form requirements can be characterized
as clearly as they can be, as falling within "the province and the duty
of the [courts] to say what the law is," then we place the courts in
the centre of the controversy rather than on the periphery. The
question becomes, not whether one Parliament can bind another,
but how the courts should address cases in which they are confronted with legislation that has not been enacted in accordance with
manner and form requirements set forth in an earlier enactment of
that same legislative body. The change is, of course, largely
symbolic. But it is none the less important, because it provides a
different starting point for the inquiry and makes it easier to break
out of the arid conceptualism that has dominated the debate to this
point.
How should courts address such cases? My answer to that
question is a function of the way in which I conceive of
constitutional issues generally and of questions about the
effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements in
particular. All constitutional issues - even those that can be said to
be governed by rules embodied in an entrenched constitution or the
common law of the constitution - are ultimately about values. Our
proclivity for looking to rules to find solutions to constitutional
issues has tended to blind us to this, because rules are seldom
formulated in terms of values. Take, for example, the rules
generated by Dicey's and the new view formulations of the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty. Neither of those rules is expressed in
terms of values. Yet no one can doubt that the constitutional issue
that these rules are designed to resolve engages a broad range of
values - the accountability of the government to the electorate,
majority rule, formal equality, and the right of self-government at a
minimum.

to be binding, the override would be valid and the legislation would be immune from
challenge.
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If constitutional issues are ultimately about values, it makes
sense to resolve them, not only with that in mind, but with careful
attention being paid to what values are engaged by a particular
issue, why those values are important and, if they come into conflict
as they almost always do, why one set should win out over another.
Courts may not always be free to act in this way because they are
often constrained by existing rules. For example, courts in a country
with an entrenched constitutional provision stipulating that no
self-imposed manner and form requirements were to be given effect
would have little, if any, occasion to approach questions about the
effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements from an
explicitly value-oriented perspective. But most such rules, whether
they be found in the text of an entrenched constitution or in the
common law of the constitution, leave ample scope for such a
perspective because of the generality and vagueness of the language
in which they are formulatedSS
For the purposes of this part of the paper, I am, of course,
assuming that the courts in the countries with which we are
concerned are not governed by existing rules about the effectiveness
of self-imposed manner and form requirements. For them, the
question is an open one. How are they to approach it? They
should do so in a manner that best ensures that the values of the
legal and political culture of the society in question are respected
and enhanced. Directing the courts to resolve questions about the
effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form requirements on the
basis of their best assessment of the underlying values of the legal
and political culture is conceded to be a rather vague form of
direction. But it is necessary, I think, to be somewhat vague at this
stage. What I am proposing is not a rule that is designed - as the
rules generated by the opposing formulations of the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty are designed - to provide a more or less
ready answer to such questions, but a way of conceiving or thinking
about such questions. And it is a way of conceiving or thinking
about such questions that permits one to resolve them on the basis
of an analysis of what is truly at stake.

55 Values, or more particularly those values the courts consider it appropriate to

promote, come into play in the act of interpreting and applying the rules.
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Moreover, when this approach came to be applied, much of
the vagueness would quickly evaporate. There is obviously a
common thread running through manner and form requirements
from the perspective of the values they engage - all of them in one
form or another engage values associated with democratic
self-government. They may engage other values as well - for
example, linguistic duality, as in Mercure - but they will at least
engage these. This means that the analysis in each case will
proceed along very similar lines, with many of the same values being
identified and discussed and many of the decisions turning on the
same kinds of choices. It is also the case that the courts will be
using very similar sources to assist them in the making of these
choices. The primary source, and this will be true in countries
without an entrenched Constitution as well as in countries with an
entrenched Constitution, will be the Constitution itself. For it is
there that one is presumably most likely to find the values
underlying the legal and political culture of the country expressed.5 6
It goes without saying that if this approach were to be taken,
it would be open to courts to conclude that some self-imposed
manner and form requirements were binding while others were not.
In spite of the common thread running through them, not all
manner and form requirements engage the same values. And
manner and form requirements that do engage the same values may
do so in different ways or to a different extent. For example, the
manner and form requirements at issue in both Manuel and the
problem I set my students engage values associated with democratic
self-government. But they engage them in very different ways. The
requirement said to have been imposed in Manuel would have
promoted such values because it would have enhanced the scope of
public participation in the process by which the Canada Act 1982
came to be enacted.5 7 The requirement hypothesized for the
purpose of the problem, by contrast, would have threatened such
56 1 am using the term "constitution" here in its broadest sense as including not only tile
text of the relevant constitutional documents, but also the doctrine engrafted onto that text
by the courts, constitutional conventions, constitutional traditions, and the organizing principles

of the constitution generally.
57 This assumes a conception of democracy that goes beyond the elitist "government by
representatives" conception that predominates in most of the Western world.
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values because it would have made it very difficult, if not impossible,
to exercise a critically important aspect of
for future generations
58
self-government.
The fact that this approach is flexible in the sense that it
permits the courts to take note of, and give expression in their
analysis to, the differences between one manner and form
requirement and another, does not, of course, preclude the
possibility of creating categories of manner and form requirements
that are governed by a general rule. In fact, given the way in which
the courts tend to function, it is not only possible but likely that this
would happen. For example, there is every reason to believe that
the courts of the countries with which we are primarily concerned
- Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and others that have
adopted the British parliamentary system - would hold that, in all
but the most unusual circumstances, self-imposed manner and form
requirements that call for an increased majority vote of a legislative
body to alter or repeal legislation enacted by that same body were
not binding. That case would be grounded in the proposition that
such requirements offend one of the basic tenets of the form of
democratic government found in such countries - majority rule. If
effect is given to a requirement that a provincial legislature legislate
only when, say, three-quarters of its members support the legislation,
it will clearly be the minority within that province, not the majority,
that governs. If twenty-five percent plus one of the members
oppose the enactment of that legislation, the legislation will not be
enacted; it will be their wishes, and not the wishes of the majority,
that prevail. 59 Manner and form requirements that call for the
holding of public referenda would also likely be governed by a
general rule, although that rule might well vary from country to
country. The critical determinant would likely be the extent to
which public referenda and other forms of direct democracy are
used to determine the direction of public policy in each country.

58 This assumes a conception of democracy that does not include the necessity of having
constitutionally entrenched and judicially enforceable rights and freedoms.
59 This is true, of course, only in the negative sense of being able to prevent changes.
There would be no complete transfer of power to the minority, only a granting of the power
to preserve the status quo.
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Courts in those countries that have an established tradition of direct
democracy are obviously going to be far less concerned about giving
effect to requirements that call for public referenda than courts in
countries that do not.60 Such requirements would be seen as
promoting the values of democratic self-government as they have
evolved in the former, but challenging those same values as they
have evolved in the latter.
The likelihood is, of course, that few self-imposed manner
and form requirements would be held to be binding if this approach
were to be adopted. Most judges, simply by virtue of who they are
and the role they see themselves playing, are going to be reluctant
to see the traditional way of doing things within the legislative
branch of government come under attack, and will be wary of claims
that effect should be given to requirements that call for change,
particularly significant change. 61 The fact that the approach calls for
judges to reach their decisions on the basis of the values underlying
the society in which they live is likely to reinforce this tendency to
conservatism. There will, however, be some judges who will be
sympathetic to at least some innovations in the process by which we
determine the content of our law, particularly those that would have
the effect of diffusing the overwhelming power now exercised by the
executive branch of government and/or opening up that process to
a greater degree of participation by groups within society that have
traditionally lacked access to the levers of political power.62 Unlike
Dicey's approach, this alternative approach at least makes it possible
for these judges to permit such reforms to take hold. A constitution
gives expression to an extremely broad range of often conflicting
values and, in the hands of creative and determined judges, can
usually be invoked in support of conceptions of democracy different

60 Hence, courts in Australia are likely to look more favourably on referendum

requirements than courts in Canada.

For a description of the extent to which direct

democracy schemes have taken hold in Australia, see G. de Q. Walker, Initiatie and

Referenditm: The People's Law (Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies, 1987).
61 J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Juticiary,2d ed. (London:

Fontana, 1981).

62 A good example of a requirement that fits the latter description would be one
stipulating that legislation dealing with abortion had to be approved by a majority of the
women MPs or MLAs.
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than the one that appears to be dominant at a particular moment
in time. The range of available alternatives may vary a bit from
country to country, and some conceptions may be easier to find in
some constitutions than in others, but there will always be room for
some flexibility.
Even if courts that saw fit to employ this approach were
generally inclined to be conservative in applying it, the fact that it
empowers judges to make important and, in many cases, no doubt,
contestable choices about the way in which a society is to be
governed, leaves it open to the criticism that it gives judges too
much power. 63 That this approach gives judges a great deal of
power cannot be denied. But it must be remembered that the
power to choose the particular conception of democracy by which a
society is to be governed will reside with the courts regardless of
which approach they take to the question of the effectiveness of
self-imposed manner and form requirements: that power inheres in
the duty of the courts to determine what the law is. If there is a
distinction between this approach and the approaches generated by
Dicey's and the new view formulations of the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, it lies in the manner in which the power
is exercised. Dicey's formulation requires that that power always be
exercised in favour of the status quo - that is, in favour of the
society being governed by simple majority vote of Parliament. The

63 There is a large and rapidly expanding body of literature on the problems of judicial
review in the constitutional sphere. For a sampling of this literature, both American and
Canadian, see A.M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust:
A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); P. Bobbitt,
ConstitutionalFate: Theory of the Constitution (New York- Oxford University Press, 1982);
MJ.Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of
ConstitutionalPolicymaking by the Judiciary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); R.M.
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); M.V. Tushnet,
Re4 White and Blue: A Critical Anaysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1988); A- Petter, 'The Politics of the Charter" (1986) 8 Sup. Ct L.Rev. 473;
PJ. Monahan, "Judicial Review and Democracy. A Theory of Judicial Review" (1987) 21
U.B.C. L Rev. 87; M. Mandel, The Charterof Rights and the Legalizationof Politics in Canada
(Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989); J.Fudge, "e
Public/Private Distinction: The
Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles"
(1987) Osgoode Hall L.J. 485; J.Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation - Social Change: You
Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)" [forthcoming, (1991) 70:2 Can.
Bar Rev.].
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new view formulation, in the hands of Jennings and Heuston
requires that the power always be exercised in the same way also,
except that it operates in favour of change - that is, in favour of
the society being governed by whatever set of procedural rules
Parliament has chosen to impose on itself. In the hands of
Friedmann and Hogg, the new view formulation does not require
that the power always be exercised in the same way - the courts can
exercise it in favour of either the status quo or change depending
on the pith and substance of the particular manner and form
requirement in question.
Because courts are always required to exercise the power in
the same way under both Dicey's formulation and the new view
formulation as it is applied by Jennings and Heuston, it can be said
with some justification that there is less scope for judges to impose
their own views of how society can best be governed if one of them
is adopted than if the approach that I am suggesting were adopted.
But that is to say nothing more, in this one respect, than that these
other approaches may have an advantage over the one that I am
proposing. It is not to say that, on that account, either of these
approaches is to be preferred. To reach that further conclusion,
one would have to be of the view that it is worth living with the
problems associated with one of these approaches in order to avoid
the problem of giving judges a somewhat freer hand in deciding how
a society is to govern itself. That is not a view to which I would
subscribe.
I say this primarily because I consider the problems
associated with each of these approaches to be particularly grave
ones.64 But I say it also because there are grounds for not attaching
too much weight to the problem of giving judges a somewhat freer
hand in this area. For one thing, there is no reason to believe that
the courts would be called upon to rule on the effectiveness of
self-imposed manner and form requirements with any great
frequency. Even if legislators knew that some such requirements
might be held to be effective - which they would do if the courts
explicitly adopted my approach - it is hardly to be expected that we
would see a lot of them enacted. Respect for principles like
64 These problems are discussed above in text accompanying and following notes 47-49.
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majority rule will, I think it is fair to say, always run deep amongst
legislators, not always or necessarily because of their intrinsic merit,
but because of the dictates of self-interest. Every member of a
governing party contemplating the enactment of a manner and form
requirement that is designed to make it more difficult for future
legislatures to enact certain kinds of legislation knows that sooner or
later he or she - or at least his or her party - will be in opposition,

at which time, as they say, the shoe will be on the other foot. In
short, unlike judicial review under the Charter, which occurs with
great frequency, there is good reason to believe that judicial review
in this area will likely be a very infrequent occurrence. Moreover,
the consequence of holding as invalid legislation that has not been
enacted in accordance with self-imposed manner and form
requirements is not that the legislation cannot be enacted at all; it
is simply that the legislation cannot be enacted unless and until the
manner and form requirement in question has either been satisfied
or repealed. It is true that some manner and form requirements
might be very difficult to satisfy or to repeal, but I think it highly
unlikely that the courts would hold these requirements to be
effective. The point here is that this is not an area in which the
courts would have the final say. Ultimate power would continue to
reside with the electorate and its representatives.
Any advantage that the approaches flowing from the Dicey,
Jennings, and Heuston's conceptions of parliamentary sovereignty
might be able to claim over my approach, insofar as limiting judicial
choice is concerned, is clearly lost when one turns to the
Friedmann-Hogg approach. Judges would have every bit as much
freedom of choice under that approach as they would under mine.
Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the choices would be
driven by many of the same considerations under the two
approaches. The only difference between the two is that my
approach encourages judges to be open and candid about those
considerations while the other does not. If openness and candidness
on the part of judges are thought to be important, and I believe
they are, the approach that I am proposing is clearly to be
preferred. That is true even without taking into account the other
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problems associated with the Friedmann-Hogg approach discussed
65
above.
Convincing the courts in Canada to adopt this alternative
approach would not, I confess, be an easy task. The traditional way
of thinking about the effectiveness of self-imposed manner and form
requirements appears to be very firmly entrenched in both the
academic commentary and the jurisprudence in this area. More
importantly, what I consider to be the advantages of the alternative
approach - that is, its flexibility, the fact that it obliges courts to
acknowledge that they are not passive actors but the makers of
important and contestable choices, and the fact that it encourages
them to make those choices openly and on the basis of their
assessment of how the underlying values of our legal and political
culture can best be served - would likely be seen as disadvantages
by at least some judges. But the cause is by no means a hopeless
one. The fact that we in Canada have an entrenched Constitution
which has primacy over all other law clearly provides a powerful
incentive not to turn to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty for
answers to questions about the effectiveness of self-imposed manner
and form requirements. It is to the provisions of the Constitution
of Canada that we should be turning for answers to such questions,
in particular to those provisions that define and delimit the
legislative authority of Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
My own view is that attempts by the Parliament of Canada or a
provincial legislature to alter the process by which legislation is to
be enacted would, if they were to be valid and hence effective,
presumably have to be characterized as exercises of the powers
granted to the Parliament of Canada and the provincial legislatures
by sections 44 and 45, respectively, of the ConstitutionAct, 1982.66
Whether or not a particular attempt is effective is going to depend
65 These problems are discussed above in text following note 49.
66 Constitution Acq 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Sections 44 & 45 read as follows:

44. Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament may exclusively make laws amending
the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada
or the Senate and House of Commons.
45. Subject to section 41, the legislature of each province may exclusively make
laws amending the constitution of the province.
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on how the terms used in those provisions - terms like "the
constitution of the province" - are interpreted. 67 What I am
suggesting is that that interpretation should respect the underlying
values of the Constitution as a whole. That can hardly be said to
be a radical suggestion.
Moreover, it is not the case that commitment to the
traditional approach on the part of those who have employed it has
been uniformly wholehearted, nor is it the case that support for the
alternative approach that I am proposing cannot be found in some
of the commentary and jurisprudence. Both the shortcomings of the
traditional approach and the benefits of this alternative approach
are clearly reflected in, if not explicitly acknowledged by, the
recently published White Paper of the Government of New Zealand
entitled "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand."68 In the course of that
White Paper, the Government, which had expressed an intention to
introduce a Bill of Rights very similar in content to the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms into the New Zealand Parliament,
examined the question of whether or not such a Bill of Rights could
be made to prevail over inconsistent future legislation given the fact
that New Zealand lacks an entrenched Constitution.
Was it
possible, in other words, for the Parliament that enacted the Bill of
Rights effectively to entrench it?
The White Paper answers that question in the affirmative,
albeit somewhat equivocally.
The solution, it suggests, is to
incorporate in the Bill of Rights a manner and form requirement to
the effect that no provision in it could be "repealed or amended or

67

As the Reference Re Authority of Parliamentin Relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1

S.C.R. 54 makes clear, it cannot be assumed that the power to amend given by sections 44
and 45 to Parliament and the provincial legislatures, respectively, will be interpreted as
generously as the terms used would suggest they should be. In the case of both -sections,

there is every reason to believe that limitations on the power would be implied from other
provisions of the Constitution of Canada, and from our constitutional history and traditions
in much the same way that the Supreme Court of Canada, in that reference, found there to
be limitations on the power to amend given to Parliament by the old section 91(1) of the
ConstitutionAct 1867. (See also A.G. Quebec v. Blaikie (No. 1), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016.)
68 (1985) [hereinafter White Paper]. The White Paper was presented to the New Zealand

House of Representatives by then Minister of Justice (and later Prime Minister) Geoffrey
Palmer. It would appear that the Labour Government has since abandoned its plan to enact
a Bill of Rights for New Zealand.
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in any way affected" by future legislation unless that legislation was
approved either by seventy-five percent of the members of the
House of Representatives or by a majority of the electorate in a
referendum. 69 The courts would be likely, the White Paper says, to
70
hold that such a requirement was binding on future Parliaments.
Support for that view was said to come from cases like Trethowan
and Ranasinghe, as well as from academic commentary supporting
the new view of parliamentary sovereignty. 71
But the White Paper is quick to point out that there is no
certainty that the courts would rule this way. It notes that
[i]t is the courts which have the ultimate task of determining what the law is ...
While there are strong grounds for believing that the courts would accept
entrenchment of something as important as a Bill of Rights, they would probably

not accept one which was forced through Parliament by a simple majority ...
A
statute of this nature is of such major significance that there needs to be a general

consensus amongst the public, both that it is needed and on its content. If this
consensus exists, it is far more likely
that the courts will rule in favour of effective
72
entrenchment of a Bill of Rights.

In form, these observations appear as part of an analysis based on
the standard approach to questions about the effectiveness of
self-imposed manner and form requirements. They are made, the
White Paper says, because "the matter is not clear" (by which the
authors mean that the standard approach does not provide a clear
answer). 73 But I prefer to view them as, if not a rejection of that
approach, at least a recognition that it provides an inadequate basis
upon which to resolve such questions. The question of whether or
not the Bill of Rights could be effectively entrenched is
69 Section 28 of the proposed Bill of Rights, ibid. at 118.

70 Ibid at 56.
71 Ibid. at 55-56.
72 Ibid. at 57.

In support of this view of the matter, the authors quote a passage from

an address delivered by Sir Robin Cooke, a member of the New Zealand Court of Appeal,

entitled "Practicalities of a Bill of Rights," reprinted in (1984) 112 Council Brief 4. In that
passage he says, "The truth is that, in the end, whether guaranteed rights are really
fundamental (able to be overridden only by a special parliamentary majority or a referendum)

does not depend on legal logic. It depends on a value judgment by the courts, based on
their view of the will of the people."

73 Ibid
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acknowledged to involve more than the characterization of a
particular group of words as either a substantive or a procedural
limitation on future Parliaments. It involves matters of fundamental
constitutional policy that will ultimately be resolved by the courts.
And it will be resolved by the courts primarily, or at least partly, on
the basis of the extent to which they can be satisfied that the
change in policy that such a step would represent has the support
of the citizenry; on the basis, in other words, of a sensitivity to the
principles of democratic self-government.
A careful reading of the judgment in Mercure suggests that
it too could be said to lend support to the alternative approach that
I am proposing. It is true that La Forest J. invoked both Jennings
and Hogg to buttress his conclusion that the requirement that both
French and English be used in the enactment of legislation by the
Saskatchewan Legislature was binding on that Legislature. But he
placed a good deal of emphasis in his analysis both on the fact that
the requirement was imposed by what he termed Saskatchewan's
"constituent statute" 74 and on the fact that the requirement was
"aimed at an accommodation of an historically sensitive matter like
the use of the English and French languages in this country."75 The
implication seems to be not only that not every self-imposed manner
and form requirement will necessarily be held to be binding, but that
the decision as to whether a particular requirement will be held to
be binding will be based at least in part on an assessment of how
Canada's basic constitutional values - one of which is clearly
linguistic duality - can best be served. It is worth noting, in this
regard, that in no sense could it be said that the manner and form
requirement at issue in Mercure represented a threat to democratic
values. If anything, that requirement promoted such values because
it facilitated participation in the legislative process by Frenchspeaking residents of the province.
Even if one is not prepared to read Mercure as explicitly
endorsing the approach that I am suggesting, there is good reason
to believe that the result in that case is the same as the result that
would have been arrived at if my approach had been used. At the
Mercure, supra, note 10 at 277 and 279.
75 Ibid. at 277.
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very least, therefore, Mercure does not constitute a bar to the
adoption of that approach at some point in the future.
Finally, it can be said with some justification that the
approach that I am proposing is already being applied by the courts
when they employ the doctrine of implied repeal in cases in which
they are confronted with a conflict between two primary rules.76 By
preferring the later enactment to the earlier, they are protecting the
value of democratic self-government. To prefer the earlier to the
later would be to permit the policies of the representatives of some
previous electorate to prevail over the policies of the representatives
of today's electorate, and thereby to inhibit the ability of today's
electorate to govern itself. That ability, which is obviously integral
to democratic self-government, is preserved intact by the doctrine of
implied repeal. If this is the approach the courts take when the
conflict is between two primary rules, why should it not be the
approach they take when the conflict arises out of a failure to
satisfy a self-imposed manner and form requirement?
V. CONCLUSION
My first year students no longer have to worry about solving
the mystery of what to do with self-imposed manner and form
requirements in the course of their legal writing program. Changes
to our first year curriculum have resulted in Constitutional Law
being moved into the upper years and the course I now teach in
first year is not one in which it would be appropriate to deal with
the issue. Had these changes not occurred, I must confess that I
would have been of two minds about whether to continue setting a
problem in the area. The problem I used to use remains a good
one, but I suspect that the students' judgment when they came to
tackle it would be unduly influenced by the fact that their professor
had expressed his views on the matter in print.
But the fact that my students are free of the issue does not
mean that the rest of us can ignore it. Although not an issue that
the courts are frequently called upon to address in any of the
76 See, for example, E.A. Dreidger, The Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1983) at 174.
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countries with which we have been concerned, it is clearly an issue
of considerable theoretical importance. Not only does it raise
fundamental questions about the way in which a country should be
governed (for example, should a country be governed by simple
majority vote of the people's representatives, by that in combination
with some form of direct democracy involving the electorate, or one
or more of a broad range of other options?) but it brings into stark
relief the power of the courts to determine what those answers
should be.
But there is a practical reason for being concerned about this
issue as well. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Mercure may well, at least in this country, embolden legislative
bodies who, for one reason or another, would like to make changes
in the way in which legislation within their jurisdiction is to be
enacted, through the imposition of manner and form requirements
in ordinary legislation. If that were to occur, it would not be long
before the courts would be asked to rule on the effectiveness of one
of these requirements. At that point, the question of how we
should be thinking about such requirements would, I hope, be
raised. Are we to continue to think about them in terms of which
of two formulations of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty we
favour? Or are we to break new ground and think about them in
terms of the constitutional values they engage? My hope, clearly, is
that the courts opt for the latter approach.

